Perestroika (“restructuring” in Russian) refers to a series of political and economic reforms meant to kick-start the stagnant 1980s economy of the Soviet Union. Its architect, President Mikhail Gorbachev, would oversee the most fundamental changes to his nation’s economic engine and political structure since the Russian Revolution. But the suddenness of these reforms, coupled with growing instability both inside and out of the Soviet Union, would contribute to the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991.
Early Attempts at Reform
In May 1985, two months after coming to power, Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a speech in St. Petersburg (then known as Leningrad), in which he publicly criticized the inefficient economic system of the Soviet Union, making him the first Communist leader to do so.
This was followed by a February 1986 speech to the Communist Party Congress, in which he expanded upon the need for political and economic restructuring, or perestroika, and called for a new era of transparency and openness, or glasnost.
But by 1987, these early attempts at reform had achieved little, and Gorbachev embarked on a more ambitious program.
Perestroika Outrages Soviet Bureaucrats
Gorbachev loosened centralized control of many businesses, allowing some farmers and manufacturers to decide for themselves which products to make, how many to produce, and what to charge for them.
This incentivized them to aim for profits, but it also went against the strict price controls that had been the bedrock of Soviet economic policies. It was a move that rankled many high-ranking officials who had previously headed these powerful central committees.
In May 1988, Gorbachev introduced a new policy that allowed for the creation of limited co-operative businesses within the Soviet Union, which led to the rise of privately owned stores, restaurants and manufacturers. Not since the short-lived New Economic Policy of Vladimir Lenin, instituted in 1922 after the Russian civil war, had aspects of free-market capitalism been permitted in the U.S.S.R.
But even here, Gorbachev tread lightly. As William Taubman, historian and author of Gorbachev: His Life and Times, notes, “This was a way of introducing private enterprise without calling it that.”
In fact, the term “private property” was never even used. Many of these new co-ops became the basis of the oligarchical system that continues to control power in Russia today.
Gorbachev Relaxes Trade Restrictions
Gorbachev also peeled back restrictions on foreign trade, streamlining processes to allow manufacturers and local government agencies to bypass the previously stifling bureaucratic system of the central government.
He encouraged Western investment, although he later reversed his original policy, which called for these new business ventures to be majority Russian-owned and operated.
He also showed initial restraint when laborers began to push for increased protections and rights, with thousands protesting the wild inefficiencies of the Soviet coal industry. But he again reversed course when faced with pressure from hardliners after a massive strike by 300,000 miners in 1991.
Economic Reforms Backfire
While Gorbachev had instituted these reforms to jumpstart the sluggish Soviet economy, many of them had the opposite effect. The agricultural sector, for example, had provided food at low cost thanks to decades of heavy government subsidies.
Now, it could charge higher prices in the marketplace – prices many Soviets could not afford. Government spending and Soviet debt skyrocketed, and pushes by workers for higher wages led to dangerous inflation.
If Gorbachev faced opposition from the entrenched hardliners that he was moving too far, too fast, he was criticized for doing just the opposite by others. Some liberals called for full-fledged abolishment of central planning committees entirely, which Gorbachev resisted.
As Taubman notes, “His more radical critics would say he didn’t move fast enough to create a market economy, but the reason he didn’t was that the very effort to do so would produce chaos, which in fact it did under [Boris] Yeltsin.”
Political Reforms Under Perestroika
As reforms under glasnost revealed both the horrors of the Soviet past, and its present-day inefficiencies, Gorbachev moved to remake much of the political system of the U.S.S.R.
At a Party meeting in 1988, he pushed through measures calling for the first truly democratic elections since the Russian Revolution of 1917. Hardliners who supported this initially believed that the date for these elections would be far enough in the future that they could control the process. Instead, Gorbachev announced that they would be held just months later.
The resulting campaign for the new Congress of People’s Deputies was remarkable. While some Communist Party members reserved many of the seats for themselves, other hardliners went down to defeat at the ballot box to liberal reformers.
Former dissidents and prisoners, including Nobel laureate physicist and activist Andrei Sakharov, were elected as candidates waged Western-style campaigns.
When the new Congress met for its first session in May 1989, newspapers, television and radio stations – newly empowered by the lifting of press restrictions under glasnost – devoted hours of time to the meetings, which featured open conflict between conservatives and liberals.
“Everybody stopped working,” Taubman says. “It was as if the whole country started watching television…the windows were open, and you could hear the debates coming out of apartment windows.” In 1990, Gorbachev became the first – and only – President of the Soviet Union.
Opponents of Perestroika Counterattack
But as with economic reforms, many of these newly-elected reformers used their platforms to criticize what they still considered limited change. And the pushback by hardliners was just as fierce.
In March 1988, the largest newspaper in the Soviet Union published a full-throttled attack on Gorbachev by chemist and social critic Nina Andreyeva. The article, “I Cannot Forsake My Principles,” was likely written with the tacit approval of several members of the Politburo, the highest-echelon of the Communist Party, and was seen as an attempt to destabilize Gorbachev.
Gorbachev’s additional reforms, which allowed for the creation of political parties, and increasingly shifted autonomy and control to local and regional bodies, rather than the central government, weakened his own base of support as the Communist Party lost its monopoly on political power in the vast Soviet Union.
International Events Under Perestroika
Gorbachev held firm on a promise to end Soviet involvement in a war in Afghanistan, which the U.S.S.R. invaded in 1979. After 10 controversial years and nearly 15,000 Soviet deaths, troops fully withdrew in 1989.
The Soviets began increasingly engaging with the West, and Gorbachev forged key relationships with leaders including British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, West German leader Helmut Kohl and most famously, United States President Ronald Reagan.
It was with the staunchly anti-Communist Reagan that Gorbachev, a new kind of Communist leader, achieved a series of landmark agreements, including the 1987 INF Treaty that eliminated all intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe. That same year, Reagan stood near the Berlin Wall and gave the most famous speech of his presidency: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”
Result of Perestroika: Soviet Bloc Collapses
The failure of Gorbachev’s Perestroika hastened the fall of the Soviet Union. After decades of heavy-handed control over Eastern Bloc nations, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev eased their grip. In 1988, he announced to the United Nations that Soviet troop levels would be reduced, and later said that the U.S.S.R. would no longer interfere in the domestic affairs of those countries.
The remarkable speed of the collapse of these satellite countries was stunning: By the end of 1989 the Berlin Wall came down and Germany was on the path to reunification, and relatively peaceful revolutions had brought democracy to countries like Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania.
Inspired by reforms with the Soviet Union under both perestroika and glasnost, as well as the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, nationalist independence movements began to swell within the U.S.S.R. in the late 1980s.
As the difficulties of half a decade of reform rattled the stability of Communist Party, Gorbachev attempted to right the ship, shifting his positions to appease both hardliners and liberals. His increasing appeals for Western support and assistance, particularly to President George H. W. Bush, went unheeded.
In August 1991, a coup by hardliners aligned with some members of the KGB attempted to remove Gorbachev, but he maintained in control, albeit temporarily.
In December, almost 75 years after the Russian Revolution ushered in the Communist Party era, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Gorbachev resigned on December 25, 1991. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the Cold War was over.
Gorbachev: His Life and Times, by William Taubman (W. Norton & Company, 2017).
Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire, by Victor Sebestyen (Vintage, 2010).
Milestones of Perestroika: Spiegel Online.
Greater Glasnost Turns Some Soviet Heads. The New York Times, November 9, 1986.
Glasnost and Its Limits: Commentary Magazine (July, 1988).
Perestroika and Glasnost: 17 Moments in Soviet History, Macalester College and Michigan State University.
Perestroika, Library of Economics and Liberty.
New Struggle in the Kremlin: How to Change the Economy. The New York Times, June 4, 1987).
Perestroika: Reform that changed the world. BBC News, March 10 2015.
Glasnost: RT Media.
The Cold War (1945–1989)
On 11 March 1985, at the age of 54 , Mikhail Gorbachev, an apparatchik of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), was appointed General Secretary of the CPSU by the Central Committee. He aimed to carry out a root-and-bran ch reform of the Soviet system, the bureaucratic inertia of which constituted an obstacle to economic reconstruction (‘perestroika’), and, at the same time, to liberalise the regime and introduce transparency (‘glasnost’), i.e. a certain freedom of expression and information.
In order to implement this ambitious policy successfully, Gorbachev had to limit the USSR’s international commitments and reduce its military expenditure so as to curb the country’s moral and economic decline. This resulted in a resumption of dialogue between the Americans and the Soviets concerning nuclear arms and the establishment of closer relations with the European Community. At the same time, Gorbachev terminated Soviet involvement in other parts of the world, withdrawing from Afghanistan, where the Russian army was bogged down, exerting pressure on the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia and restoring Sino-Soviet relations, withdrawing Soviet support for the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia and for Cuban troops in Angola, ending economic aid to Cuba and withdrawing Soviet troops from the island, restoring diplomatic relations with Israel and condemning Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Gorbachev’s policy of disengagement would be even more marked in Europe, with regard to the former satellite states of the USSR.
Although popular with the West, Gorbachev was far less so in his own country, where his reforms resulted in the disruption of the centralised planning system without the implementation of any real market mechanisms. This resulted in reduced production, shortages and social discontent, which led to strikes. This discontent could be all the more strongly expressed within the system of ‘transparency’ all previously withheld information concerning the activities of the state and its administrative bodies might henceforth be disclosed and publicly debated. The lifting of the taboos imposed by the Communist regime, of which intellectuals and liberated dissidents took full advantage, allowed critical judgment to be passed on the history of the Soviet Union and on its political, economic and social structure.
The Gorbachev era: perestroika and glasnost
When Brezhnev died in 1982, most elite groups understood that the Soviet economy was in trouble. Due to senility, Brezhnev had not been in effective control of the country during his last few years, and Kosygin had died in 1980. The Politburo was dominated by old men, and they were overwhelmingly Russian. Non-Russian representation at the top of the party and the government had declined over time. Yury V. Andropov and then Konstantin Chernenko led the country from 1982 until 1985, but their administrations failed to address critical problems. Andropov believed that the economic stagnation could be remedied by greater worker discipline and by cracking down on corruption. He did not regard the structure of the Soviet economic system itself to be a cause of the country’s growing economic problems.
When Gorbachev became head of the Communist Party in 1985, he launched perestroika (“restructuring”). His team was more heavily Russian than that of his predecessors. It seems that initially even Gorbachev believed that the basic economic structure of the U.S.S.R. was sound and therefore only minor reforms were needed. He thus pursued an economic policy that aimed to increase economic growth while increasing capital investment. Capital investment was to improve the technological basis of the Soviet economy as well as promote certain structural economic changes. His goal was quite plain: to bring the Soviet Union up to par economically with the West. This had been a goal of Russian leaders since Peter the Great unleashed the first great wave of modernization and Westernization. After two years, however, Gorbachev came to the conclusion that deeper structural changes were necessary. In 1987–88 he pushed through reforms that went less than halfway to the creation of a semi-free market system. The consequences of this form of a semi-mixed economy with the contradictions of the reforms themselves brought economic chaos to the country and great unpopularity to Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s radical economists, headed by Grigory A. Yavlinsky, counseled him that Western-style success required a true market economy. Gorbachev, however, never succeeded in making the jump from the command economy to even a mixed economy.
Gorbachev launched glasnost (“openness”) as the second vital plank of his reform efforts. He believed that the opening up of the political system—essentially, democratizing it—was the only way to overcome inertia in the political and bureaucratic apparatus, which had a big interest in maintaining the status quo. In addition, he believed that the path to economic and social recovery required the inclusion of people in the political process. Glasnost also allowed the media more freedom of expression, and editorials complaining of depressed conditions and of the government’s inability to correct them began to appear.
As the economic and political situation began to deteriorate, Gorbachev concentrated his energies on increasing his authority (that is to say, his ability to make decisions). He did not, however, develop the power to implement these decisions. He became a constitutional dictator—but only on paper. His policies were simply not put into practice. When he took office, Yegor Ligachev was made head of the party’s Central Committee Secretariat, one of the two main centres of power (with the Politburo) in the Soviet Union. Ligachev subsequently became one of Gorbachev’s opponents, making it difficult for Gorbachev to use the party apparatus to implement his views on perestroika.
By the summer of 1988, however, Gorbachev had become strong enough to emasculate the Central Committee Secretariat and take the party out of the day-to-day running of the economy. This responsibility was to pass to the local soviets. A new parliament, the Congress of People’s Deputies, was convened in the spring of 1989, with Gorbachev presiding. The new body superseded the Supreme Soviet as the highest organ of state power. The Congress elected a new Supreme Soviet, and Gorbachev, who had opted for an executive presidency modeled on the U.S. and French systems, became the Soviet president, with broad powers. This meant that all the republics, including first and foremost Russia, could have a similar type of presidency. Moreover, Gorbachev radically changed Soviet political life when he removed the constitutional article according to which the only legal political organization was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev understood that the defense burden, perhaps equivalent to 25 percent of the gross national product, was crippling the country. This had led to cuts in expenditures in education, social services, and medical care, which hurt the regime’s domestic legitimacy. Moreover, the huge defense expenditures that characterized the Cold War years were one of the causes of Soviet economic decline. Gorbachev therefore transformed Soviet foreign policy. He traveled abroad extensively and was brilliantly successful in convincing foreigners that the U.S.S.R. was no longer an international threat. His changes in foreign policy led to the democratization of eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, Gorbachev’s policies deprived the Soviet Union of ideological enemies, which in turn weakened the hold of Soviet ideology over the people.
As the U.S.S.R.’s economic problems became more serious (e.g., rationing was introduced for some basic food products for the first time since Stalin) and calls for faster political reforms and decentralization began to increase, the nationality problem became acute for Gorbachev. Limited force was used in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Baltic states to quell nationality problems, though Gorbachev was never prepared to use systematic force in order to reestablish the centre’s control. The reemergence of Russian nationalism seriously weakened Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet empire.
In 1985 Gorbachev brought Boris Yeltsin to Moscow to run that city’s party machine. Yeltsin came into conflict with the more conservative members of the Politburo and was eventually removed from the Moscow post in late 1987. He returned to public life as an elected deputy from Moscow to the Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989. When the Congress of People’s Deputies elected the Supreme Soviet as a standing parliament, Yeltsin was not chosen, since the Congress had an overwhelmingly Communist majority. However, a Siberian deputy stepped down in his favour. Yeltsin for the first time had a national platform. In parliament he pilloried Gorbachev, the Communist Party, corruption, and the slow pace of economic reform. Yeltsin was elected president of the Russian parliament despite the bitter opposition of Gorbachev.
In March 1991, when Gorbachev launched an all-union referendum about the future Soviet federation, Russia and several other republics added some supplementary questions. One of the Russian questions was whether the voters were in favour of a directly elected president. They were, and they chose Yeltsin. He used his newfound legitimacy to promote Russian sovereignty, to advocate and adopt radical economic reform, to demand Gorbachev’s resignation, and to negotiate treaties with the Baltic republics, in which he acknowledged their right to independence. Soviet attempts to discourage Baltic independence led to a bloody confrontation in Vilnius in January 1991, after which Yeltsin called upon Russian troops to disobey orders that would have them shoot unarmed civilians.
Perestroika and Glasnost
“Perestroika” (restructuring) and “glasnost” (openness) were Mikhail Gorbachev’s watchwords for the renovation of the Soviet body politic and society that he pursued as general secretary of the Communist Party from 1985 until 1991. Neither term was new to Soviet rhetoric. Stalin occasionally had used them as had his successors. The word glasnost actually appeared in Article 9 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution although without any practical application. Both terms can be found in Gorbachev’s speeches and writings as early as the mid-1970s. But it was in a speech of December 1984, four months before his elevation to the general secretaryship, where Gorbachev first identified them — and a third term, “uskorenie” (acceleration) — as key themes. Uskorenie, with its unfortunate connotations of working faster, fell by the wayside, but perestroika and glasnost gained in importance and substance after 1986.
By 1987, Gorbachev was acknowledging that perestroika was a word with many meanings, but “the one which expresses its essence most accurately … is revolution,” since the “qualitatively new” and radical changes which the Soviet Union required constituted a “revolutionary task.” Substantively, it was to mean in the political sphere the introduction of genuinely contested elections for new political institutions (e.g., the Congress of People’s Deputies), enhancement of the governing role of the soviets, and other measures to promote democratization of the Communist Party and the entire political system. Economically, it referred to the legalization of cooperatives and other semi-private business ventures, the demonopolization and liberalization of price controls, and the election of enterprise managers by the labor collective.
Glasnost was what the British political scientist, Archie Brown, called “a facilitating concept” that enabled writers and journalists to push beyond limits that even Gorbachev and his most liberal-minded deputies, Aleksandr Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze, anticipated or approved. Rather than a gift from above, it came to mean in practice a right asserted from below, analogous to freedom of speech and publication. This radical expansion of meaning eventually proved disastrous to Gorbachev and his agenda for change. In promoting glasnost, Gorbachev assumed that it would enhance perestroika. But as the country became overwhelmed by the avalanche of reports about burgeoning criminality as well as revelations of state crimes of the past (“retrospective glasnost”), glasnost effectively undermined public confidence in the ability of the state to lead society to the promised land of prosperity or even arrest its descent into poverty and chaos.
Following World War I, Georgia was invaded and incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922. By the 1980s, an independence movement was established and grew, leading to Georgia’s secession from the Soviet Union in April 1991.
The traditional start-date of specifically Russian history is the establishment of the Rus’ state in the north in 862 ruled by Vikings. Staraya Ladoga and Novgorod became the first major cities of the new union of immigrants from Scandinavia with the Slavs and Finno-Ugrians.
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Perestroika, (Russian: “restructuring”) program instituted in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s to restructure Soviet economic and political policy. Seeking to bring the Soviet Union up to economic par with capitalist countries such as Germany, Japan, and the United States, Gorbachev decentralized economic controls and encouraged enterprises to become self-financing. The economic bureaucracy, fearing the loss of its power and privileges, obstructed much of his program, however. Gorbachev also proposed reducing the direct involvement of the Communist Party leadership in the country’s governance and increasing the local governments’ authority. In 1988 a new parliament, the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies, was created. Similar congresses were established in each Soviet republic as well. For the first time, elections to these bodies presented voters with a choice of candidates, including noncommunists, though the Communist Party continued to dominate the system. (See also glasnost.)
What Was Glasnost?
Glasnost, which translates to "openness" in English, was General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's policy for a new, open policy in the Soviet Union where people could freely express their opinions.
With glasnost, Soviet citizens no longer had to worry about neighbors, friends, and acquaintances turning them into the KGB for whispering something that could be construed as criticism of the government or its leaders. They no longer had to worry about arrest and exile for a negative thought against the State.
Glasnost allowed the Soviet people to reexamine their history, voice their opinions on governmental policies, and receive news not pre-approved by the government.
Perestroika and Glasnost - Definition, Dates and Gorbachev - HISTORY
The policy struggle in Washington further intensified when a new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, emerged in March 1985. In order to restructure the Soviet economy and reform domestic society, Gorbachev needed to reduce military spending at home and political tensions abroad. His goal was a fundamental change in the relationship between the superpowers and his method was arms control agreements. Shultz encouraged Reagan to develop a personal relationship with Gorbachev. Reagan and Gorbachev held four summit meetings between November 1985 and May 1988 in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow.
Their personal relationship produced its most practical result in December 1987, when the two leaders signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The treaty, which eliminated an entire class of missiles in Europe, was a milestone in the history of the Cold War. Although Gorbachev took the initiative, Reagan was well prepared to adopt a policy of negotiations. Shultz and the Department of State played a key role in this diplomatic approach.
Gorbachev Proposes Restructuring
Succeeding to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU upon the death of Chernenko in March, 1985, Gorbachev launched an insistent campaign for restructuring–perestroika-of the Soviet economy, with emphasis on the decentralization of responsibility and the enhancement of work incentives. He soon found that he could not successfully implement this program against the inertia of the bureaucracy without freeing up the possibilities of public criticism, and so opened the campaign for glasnost “openness” or “publicity”-with emphasis on the role of intellectuals and the press. Finally, he came to the conclusion that the crimes and blunders of the Stalinist past, covered up ever since the fall of Khrushchev, had to be exposed as fully as the legitimacy of the party’s rule would permit.
Original Source: Pravda, 24 April 1985.
… The country has achieved major successes in all fields of the life of society. Relying on the advantages of the new system, it has, in a historically brief time, ascended to the summits of economic and social progress. Today the Soviet Union possesses a mighty and comprehensively developed economy and skilled cadres of workers, specialists and scientists. We firmly hold leading positions in the world in many areas of the development of production, science and technology.
Profound changes have taken place in social life, For the first time in history, the working man has become the master of the country, the creator of his own destiny. The guaranteed right to work and remuneration, society’s concern for man from birth to old age, broad access to spiritual culture, respect for the dignity and rights of the individual, the steady expansion of the working people’s participation in management-all these are permanent values and inalienable features of the socialist way of life. They are the most important source of political stability, social optimism and confidence in the future.
Soviet people are rightly proud of all this. But life and its dynamism dictate the need for further changes and transformations, for the achievement of a new qualitative state of society, in the broadest sense of the word. This means, above all, the scientific and technical updating of production and the attainment of the highest world level of labor productivity. It means the improvement of social relations, first of all economic relations. It means profound changes in the sphere of labor and people’s material and spiritual living conditions. It means the invigoration of the entire system of political and public institutions, the deepening of socialist democracy, and self-government by the people.
The development of Soviet society will be determined, to a decisive extent, by qualitative changes in the economy, by its switch onto the tracks of intensive growth, and by an all-out increase in efficiency. The situation in the national economy should be evaluated, and future tasks determined, from precisely these positions.
It is known that, along with the successes that have been achieved in the economic development of the country, in the past few years unfavorable tendencies have intensified, and a good many difficulties have arisen. Thanks to the Party’s active work, beginning in 1983, we have been able to straighten out the work of many segments of the national economy, and the situation has improved somewhat. However, the difficulties have by no means been overcome, and we will have to exert a good deal of effort to create a reliable basis for rapid progress.
What is the reason for the difficulties? The answer to this question, as you realize, is of fundamental importance for the Party.
Natural and a number of external factors have had an impact, of course. But the main thing, I think, is that the changes in the objective conditions of the development of production, the need for accelerating its intensification and for changes in the methods of economic management were not properly assessed in good time, and-this is especially important-no perseverance was shown in working out and implementing major measures in the economic sphere. Comrades, we must become thoroughly aware of the existing situation and draw the most serious conclusions. The country’s historical destiny and the positions of socialism in today’s world depend in large part on how we handle matters from now on. By making broad use of the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution and bringing the forms of socialist economic management into line with present-day conditions and requirements, we must achieve a substantial acceleration of social and economic progress. There is simply no other way…
The main question now is: How, and at what cost, will the country be able to achieve accelerated economic development? Examining this question in the Politbiuro, we have unanimously reached the conclusion that there are real possibilities for this. The task of accelerating growth rates substantially accelerating them-is completely feasible, if the intensification of the economy and the acceleration of scientific and technical progress are placed at the center of all our work, if management, planning and structural and investment policy are restructured, if organization and discipline are enhanced everywhere, and if the style of activity is fundamentally improved…
In most branches, scientific and technical progress is proceeding listlessly, essentially at evolutionary speed-primarily through the improvement of existing technologies and the partial modernization of machinery and equipment. These measures are bringing a certain return, of course, but it is too little. We need revolutionary changes-a shift to fundamentally new technological systems, to the latest-generation equipment, which yields the highest efficiency. What this means, in essence, is there-equipment of all branches of the national economy on the basis of the present-day achievements of science and technology…
The concept of the restructuring of the economic mechanism has now become clearer to us. In continuing to develop the centralized principle in the accomplishment of strategic tasks, we must more boldly advance along the path of expanding the rights of enterprises and their independence, introduce economic accountability and, on this basis, increase the responsibility and stake of labor collectives in the final results of work.
The results of the large-scale experiment that is being conducted along these lines seem to be rather good. But they cannot fully satisfy us. The point has been reached at which a transition should be made from the experiment to the creation of an integral system of economic management and administration. This means that we should begin the practical restructuring of work in the upper echelons of economic management as well, that they should be oriented primarily toward the accomplishment of long-range social, economic, scientific and technical tasks and toward searches for the most effective forms of uniting science and production…
Comrades! The CPSU sees the highest meaning of the acceleration of the social and economic development of the country in steadily, step by step, enhancing the people’s well-being, improving all aspects of the life of soviet people, and creating favorable conditions for the harmonious development of the individual. In the process, it is necessary to consistently pursue a line aimed at strengthening social justice in the distribution of material and spiritual wealth, intensifying the influence of social factors on the development of the economy, and improving its efficiency.
This line meets with full approval and support among Soviet people. The task now is to work out concrete, effective measures to rid the distributive mechanism of wage-leveling, unearned income and everything that runs counter to the economic norms and moral ideals of our society, and to ensure that the financial position of every worker and every collective is directly dependent on the results of their labor. The Party will continue to wage a very resolute struggle against all negative phenomena alien to the socialist way of life and to our communist morality…
Source: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXXVII, No. 17 (May 22, 1985).
Perestroika and Glasnost - Definition, Dates and Gorbachev - HISTORY
Constitutional Banner Newsletter Archive A series of articles on the U.S. Constitution, what it means, what constitutes good government, etc.
Glasnost-Perestroika Articles Various articles on what Glasnost and Perestroika really means in the former Soviet Union.
As well as these books by Jonathan Neville: Moroni's America The Lost City of Zarahemla Moroni's Keys The Rule of Equity Letter VII: Oliver Cowdery's Message to the World about the Hill Cumorah Brought to Light (sorry, I believe this one is currently out of print)
New World Order--Secret Combinations Various articles on the New World Order, Secret Combinations, and the like.
Other Articles, Writings, or Reprints Articles written, talks or speeches given, or transcripts of reprinted articles given by various individuals.
It's Very Simple: The True Story of Civil Rights by Alan Stang Contains chapters (most, in an ongoing project) written by Alan Stang in his book, It's Very Simple: The True Story of Civil Rights.
"Stiff Right Jab" Articles by Steve Farrell and Steven Montgomery (Archive) A series of articles written by Steve Farrell or Steven Montgomery under the "Stiff Right Jab" title for various news or opinion websites.
Electoral College Contains various articles discussing the elements of the Electoral College provided under the United States Constitution.
Miscellaneous Articles by Steve Farrell and Diane Alden A series of articles written by either Steve Farrell or Diane Alden.
Miscellaneous Articles by Steve Farrell Various articles written by Steve Farrell.
"Missing the Mark with Religion" series by Steve Farrell Articles written by Steve Farrell under the title, "Missing the Mark with Religion."
Al Burns Series A series of articles written by the late Al Burns.
Go to the page where you can download the following files (doc and pdf format): Waking Up To Secret Combinations, by Darren Andrew and Toward Socialist America, by Robert Gorgolione, by clicking here: http://sites.google.com/site/heavenlybanner/files.
Glasnost-Perestroika: A Model Potemkin Village
By Steve Montgomery -- First published June 1988 (several times since then, I have seen fit to revise or add to the text, as occasion and time permit.)
Beginning in 1986 under the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union instituted dramatic and wide-ranging reforms. Soviet society was opened up to "criticism" and debate through a policy known as "Glasnost" and in the Soviet economy, a process was started known as "perestroika" to revitalize and restructure the Soviet economy. As part of the economic reforms, a more moderate stance was taken in domestic and foreign policy. A charismatic leader, Gorbachev was widely hailed as representing a "new breed" of leader and became widely popular in Europe and the United States. Today (March 1999), there is no doubt that fundamental changes appear to have taken place. But did the Soviet Union depart from basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology? Or are the reforms a mere subterfuge to deceive and mislead the west and actually represent a subtle "tactical shift" in an overall Marxist-Leninist strategy designed for eventual worldwide domination? Answers to these questions are extremely vital.
Ever since the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, people have disagreed over what communism really is and what it is that the communists really want. Some have hoped that changes would modify or topple the Soviet System. They have looked at various periods of softening of Soviet policy as indications that such modifications were advances towards freedom or western styled democracies. Others have consistently maintained a deep suspicion and mistrust towards the Soviet System, and have cited Soviet conduct as proof of Soviet desire for worldwide domination.
A quick look at the Soviet Union's track record is convincing evidence that an accurate perception of the policies first instituted by Gorbachev is needed. According to the French magazine, "Le Figaro", communism has directly caused the deaths of 150 million people (1) . Estimates are that an additional 2 billion people are in some kind of political slavery (2) . Just since the fall of Vietnam in 1975, over eleven countries came under Marxist governments (3) . Insurrections, wars, and Marxist inspired terrorist activities in the Philippines, Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, Lebanon, Chad, Columbia and many other countries around the world (4) . In light of this dismal track record, accurate perceptions of Glasnost and Perestroika are vital. Any misperceptions could lead to severe and lasting consequences not only for the United States but the entire free world.
Trying to understand the (former?) Soviet Union and their sometimes contradictory and conflicting policies and actions without understanding their ideology is fruitless and confusing. Winston Churchill, once said, that trying to figure out their actions without understanding the ideology that motivates them and underlies their actions, was like trying to unroll "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma (5) ". According to the Causa institute, it would be naive to think that the "ideological and moral parameters of Marxism-Leninism are the same as our own" (6) . Charles Marshall observed that "in the language of game theory, communists and noncommunists are like opponents playing different games by different rules on the same board (7) ." To understand Soviet conduct a correct understanding of Marxist-Leninist thought is necessary.
Any meaningful analysis of Glasnost-Perestroika must take into account the basic ideology that guides Soviet policy. By looking at the ideology I will show in this paper that the policies of Glasnost-Perestroika are rooted in and derive sustenance from Marxist-Leninist ideology. Furthermore, that the policies of Glasnost-Perestroika are consistent with the nature of Marxist-Leninist "tactical shifts" in an overall strategy designed to achieve worldwide domination. The past can be a key to the future and past tactical shifts can be compared to the current policy to demonstrate that the purpose of the current shifts are to strengthen the Soviet Union economically, militarily, diplomatically and socially in order to further their aim of world-domination, to broaden appeal of the Soviet Union, and to placate the West in order to extract all sorts of aid, trade and political concessions, and to negotiate arms reduction agreements--all to the (former) Soviet Union's advantage.
What is the ideology that guides the (Former?) Soviet Union in formulating their domestic and foreign policies? According to Marx, there is a revolution occurring which is progressive in nature and results from the conflict of two opposing, interacting forces. These two forces, called the Thesis and Antithesis, culminate at a critical nodal point where the existing system is overthrown and a new system is established called the Synthesis. This process, called Dialectical Materialism (7a) , Marx applied to the historical development and explained the whole course of history in those terms. Historical Materialism contends that this revolutionary concept of social change has gone through several steps. It first began with a primitive classless communal society where all property was held in common which was overthrown by a slave society, in turn overthrown by a feudal society, which was then overturned by a capitalist society, which will then be eventually overthrown by a socialist society which will enable a classless communist society to once again be established. Marxism, is, therefore, a doctrine of class warfare which is universal in nature. This class warfare would culminate in a revolution which is "historically inevitable" according to the "science" and "laws" of Marxism. In the final stage from the capitalist to the socialist society, it would be the actions of the working class or "proletariat" who would perform the actions to overthrow capitalist society. (8)
Lenin modified Marxist theory to include the Communist Party as the spearhead or "vanguard" of the proletariat which would perform the task of consummating the universal class war into world communist victory. As the vanguard, the Communist Party was to be composed only of professional revolutionaries, comprised of both covert and overt members, who would wage the war against the capitalist society. The basic doctrine of Marxism-Leninism therefore, is that a state of war exists and that the Communist Party was created to win this war.
Once they had obtained power, this vanguard would establish a transitional political rule known as the "dictatorship of the proletariat". In the Soviet Union, this dictatorship of the proletariat is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Once socialism had been achieved then supposedly the dictatorship would vanish, communism would be established, and the state would "wither" away. Lenin called it a dictatorship of the proletariat because it would use "force whenever necessary to suppress the resistance of the exploiting classes and the activity of the elements hostile to socialism (9) ." Marxist-Leninists hold that constructing socialism is impossible without the dictatorship of the proletariat. How the dictatorship would function and operate would be determined by what is needed to be done to build socialism. Its ultimate goal would be to strengthen the socialist state to the point where Communism could then be established.
A Strong economic base is essential. To strengthen the state would require "vigorous development of the economy in order to provide the electrical power, materials, resources, the science, and technology necessary for the victory of the communist system" (10) . The Dictatorship of the Proletariat would work out "the general perspective of development of the society, establish a correct political line, and organize the working people to institute the line (11) ." Marxist-Leninist theory would be realized in practice by the establishment of "proletarian dictatorships" throughout the globe as the necessary prerequisite to the transition from capitalism to socialism, and the "withering away" of the state (12) . In the Communist view "whatever the form in which the transition from capitalism to socialism is effected, that transition can come about only through revolution (13) ."
A principle known as "Democratic Centralism (14) " would operate within the Communist Party as a self-correcting and feedback system in order to ultimately strengthen the Soviet social and economic system. This principle first had its origin in Imperial Russia under Tsar Nicolas 1's reign (1825-1855). It was put in force in Tsarist Russia to provide constructive criticism for much needed social and economic reforms. It served as "an effective tool for correcting failures of bureaucratic institutions and twarting corrupt practices among officials (15) ."
Known as "Glasnost" under Tsar Nicolas 1, Lenin reintroduced the concept into the Communist state as a "leadership initiated and leadership regulated criticism designed, to reverse undesirable socio-economic trends (16) ." Lenin, in fact stated:
One function of "democratic centralism" or "Glasnost" then, is to strengthen the Soviet Economy so that "revolution" can be carried on and eventual worldwide domination assured. Another function of Glasnost (called "democratic centralism" by Lenin) was to stimulate public participation in political life, that is to say, to strengthen the regime's legitimacy (18) ". Lenin further said, "the state is strong when the masses know everything, render their opinions on every issue, and consciously respond to every policy (19) ". In other words, the Soviet people are more apt to believe and support the Government in its goals and designs if public participation were allowed. However, under Lenin, there were limits to how far criticism and debate could go. There was no free flow of information as we know it. Whatever was said had to promote the best interests of socialism and there were strict parameters within which divergent opinions could be voiced. Under Lenin, the Bolsheviks established pre-publication censorship and officially banned criticism of the new regime. Military tribunals were also established under organs of State Security. To Lenin, such repressive measures were not inconsistent with the policy of democratic-centralism which allowed for a relatively free debate on controversial policy issues.
The principle of democratic-centralism (Glasnost) was continued under Stalin. Stalin said in 1928:
The principle of democratic-centralism has been an integral part of Marxist-Leninist ideology and has been carried on by all of Lenin's successors in one form or another. When Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev introduced his policies of Glasnost they certainly were not anything new or fundamentally different. Gorbachev stated that the purpose of the reforms are to make sure that a transition from "an overly centralized command system of management" occurs to one based on a "combination of centralism and self-management" and further that "the party will tolerate no changes from the adopted principles of the economic reform. (24) " In other words the reforms were meant to assess the problems of the Soviet social and economic systems in order to deal with the necessary changes. However, the "freedom of discussion" allowed under Glasnost remains clearly controlled by the Party.
What Gorbachev is doing is removing some of the more despotic features of Glasnost as practiced by Stalin (25) . These despotic features included "severe punishment for the mere expression of dissenting opinion, rigid limitations upon allowed literary expressions, state control over all other forms of artistic endeavor, punishment for criticism of any state official or any official action, etc (26) . Gorbachev's Glasnost policy is nothing more than the modern version of the old self-criticism tool to strengthen the economic and social systems, first used in Tsarist Russia, later used by Lenin and each successive Soviet leader. Consequences of a much strengthened economy and social structure in the Soviet Union should be obvious to anyone.
Two other fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology need to be mentioned to further understand Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika policies. These are the "Dialectical nature of advance" and "communist morality". Concerning "Communist morality", we have seen that the basic doctrine of Marxism-Leninism is that a state of war exists and that the Communist Party was created to win this war In order to win this war, Lenin taught that the Communists should be ready to resort to "any trick, ruse or illegal method (27) ."
A Afanasayev,a Communist theoretician, taught that "from the point of view of communist morality, that which promotes the movement of society toward communism is moral (28) . In other words, the end justifies the means. Any means or methods therefore to advance the revolutionary cause, whether it involved lies, deception, murder, etc. would be justified by the end result-Communism. A fundamental part of Marxist-Leninist ideology is therefore trickery and deceit. A well documented study by Raymond S. Sleeper shows that the Soviets have used lies, deceit and downright chicanery in arms control, treaties, deployment of nuclear weapons, the "peace movement" use of words, in religion, the economy, etc (29) . Sleeper estimates that the Soviets also spend the equivalent of three to four billion dollars a year on strategic and tactical disinformation in the United States (30) .
A major portion of this disinformation campaign against the West is spent by the Soviets concerning the "latest" policy changes by Gorbachev and the Eastern European Satellites. Thus Sleeper tell us the latest propaganda goes somewhat like this:
Recently, we are hearing that if we don't support the Soviets by Feeding their people, giving them "most favored nation trading status" and other forms of aid and trade that the result will be a return of the so called "hard liners", a return to "Stalinism". This is just the sort of disinformation the Soviets would like us to believe. What makes this scenario all the more diabolical is that when the Soviets do return to a "hard line", blame will be placed on us because we didn't help the Soviets enough.
Part of the Soviet strategy of deception lies in their use of strategic policy changes. In the seventy-three years since the Bolshevik revolution the Soviets have implemented several shifts or changes in their foreign and economic policies. Lenin and his followers have justified sudden shifts in policy by the concept of the "dialectical nature of advance" The Communist slogan is: "nature acts dialectically. (32) " Dr. Fred Schwarz, President of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade has portrayed it as follows:
Boris Ponomarev wrote a major article for Kommunist (the house organ of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party) in 1971 which stated that the communists were still seeking a world-wide revolution (they were then in a major policy shift called "detente") and that to remain faithful to "scientific communism" the revolutionists must master "all forms and methods of the class struggle, including the ability to perform fast tactical switches (36) ." Gorbachev, in his book Perestroika said in reference to the shift his new policy was now taking that "Lenin never believed that the road to socialism,would be straight, he knew how to change slogans when life required it (37) ." That the Dialectical nature of advance is in fact a guiding principle of their ideology can be demonstrated from Soviet history. At least ten distinct left-right shifts in Soviet domestic and foreign policy have been identified (38) . Consider the following table:
|2.||1921-1928||Right||New Economic Policy (NEP)|
|8 a.||1964-1972||Right||Moribund Krushchevism|
|9.||1973-1982||Left||Support for Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Parties|
When the orientation turns left, this is a period of expansion or attempted expansion, when the orientation turns right its a time to consolidate gains, a time of retrenchment to protect gains made and strengthen for the future. Thus in the first left period from the Bolshivik revolution of 1917 to 1921, the Communists came to power in Russia and efforts were made to come to power in Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bavaria (39) . The next "left" period from 1928 to 1935, "led to abortive uprisings in China, Indochina and Brazil" (40) and "the international Communist movement sought to take advantage of a worldwide depression to stir up revolutionary activity (41) ." The third "left" period known as the Nazi-Soviet pact saw attempts at impeding the war efforts of the allied powers and Soviet forces invaded Poland, Finland, the Baltic States and Romania. The fourth "left" period, right after World War II saw the Chinese Communists come to power, the Eastern European countries go communist, the North Koreans invade the South and attempts made to come to power in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Burma and India. Some disagreement is present among scholars in the dating of the fourth left period by splitting the right "wartime alliance" into two separate periods: the first, a defensive cycle from 1941-1943, where the propaganda emphasis was on "save the USSR" the second was an offensive cycle, whose purpose was to extract major military and political concessions from the West and in this cycle the USSR gained control of Eastern and Central Europe and dominance in Manchuria and North Korea (42) . The last left period (the fifth) saw a tremendous expansion into South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, 3uinea-Bissau, Sau Tome and Principe, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Cape Verde. In this last expansionist period, Brezhnev, took advantage of the anti-war and anti-Vietnam sentiment in this country as well as a somewhat wary congress because of a new President due to the "Watergate Scandal and started two new aggressive policies: the creation and deployment of intermediate nuclear missiles and a series of expansionist moves to establish Marxist governments into various parts of Africa and the near east (43) .
Right wing shifts were characterized by the Soviets putting off hopes "for the immediate seizure of power" and instead concentrated on strengthening the Soviet state and adopted a "longer term strategy of building influence through the cultivation of alliances with noncommunists (44) . Thus, before World War II, Stalin knew that the Soviet Union was weaker than the West and Stalin stated that "it was the party's task to buy time by laying off the capitalists and to take all measures to maintain peaceful relations (45) ", and that "Our relations with the capitalist countries are based on the assumption that the coexistence of the two opposing systems is possible. Practice has fully confirmed this (46) ". Gorbachev himself stated in referring to the New Economic Policy (NEP) that "the measures of the New Economic were directed to building socialisms material foundations (47) ."
A strengthened economy for the Soviet Union would result in a strengthened military. Soviet expert, Dale Herspring, in referring to the strengthening of the Soviet Union currently occurlng under the right wing shift of "Perestroika said that if it is successful in building up the economy that more resources would be available for the military and that "the military threat facing the west could increase significantly" and that Gorbachev is out to do his best "to improve Soviet performance in this key area-the military (48) ".
During the Popular Front period, many thought we would live side by side with the Soviet Union (49) . Martin and Rees, two Soviet experts, commented concerning the wartime alliance that "the Nazi invasion converted the Soviets into a Jeffersonian Democracy, during the Wartime alliance the Soviets abused and exploited every extension of good faith and trust by Americans who were anxious to aid the allied cause. whole industrial processes, entire turnkey refineries, strategic raw materials, scientific instruments, radio manufacturing plants. and thousands of designs, drawings, paints and proprietary secrets sluiced out to the USSR by air and sea. (50) "
Former ambassador and special advisor to President Reagan, Paul H. Nitze, has written concerning the various tactical shifts the communists have undergone that:
In formulating their domestic and foreign policies and strategies it is Marxist -Leninist ideology as perceived by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which is the prism through which the policy makers view the world. They have to believe in the dogma because it is the foundation holding the regime in power. Any concession or compromise on this dogma would be suicidal for the regime and the effects on Soviet domination throughout the world would be shattering and incalculable. Soviet leaders believe (or at least pretend to believe) in Marxist-Leninist ideology because it is the linchpin of the system. It gives the Soviet Union legitimacy without which it couldn't justify its crimes. Thus, Gorbachev in outlining his "new" policy in his book, Perestroika, bases every argument he uses in Lenin. Any illusion that gorbachev is departing from Marxism-Leninism is dispelled when the reader discovers reference after reference to Lenin. Gorbachev cites or refers to Lenin at least thirty-six times in the first chapter and seven times in half a page (55) .
Another interesting feature of the last three "right-wing" shifts in tactics, is that when each of these shifts has occurred, history books are rewritten, denouncements are made about past soviet leaders who were supposedly in error on doctrine, attempts are made by party ideologues to "correct" the mistakes and great efforts are resorted to in researching the writings of Lenin to prove that the new leader is the "true heir" of Lenin. When Khrushchev came to power he announced his new "liberalization policy" by a so called "secret speech" which denounced Stalin and his "crimes". Shortly thereafter the history books were rewritten, and Stalin was berated for committing ideological sins and (on the Communist spectrum) castigated for having gone too far to the "left". After a period of reform, however, Krushchev was replaced and likewise berated for having gone too far "right", for being too much of a revisionist and Stalin once again brought back into prominence. Currently, under Gorbachev's regime similar "admissions'' of Stalinist crimes have occurred. Within one-month following Krushchev's speech, the concept to change in the Soviet Union was front-page news. Harrison Salisbury writing for the New York Times on March 25, 1956 stated the following:
The current denouncement of Stalin and his "crimes" are merely propaganda for the western press. Proof that they are a hoax comes from high-ranking Soviet defectors. Jan Sejna, a high ranking Czech. Official who defected in 1968 is quoted as saying:
ast on the shoulders of the only person responsible-Stalin (57)
Krushchev came to power in 1953, yet his "secret speech" denouncing Stalin didn't occur until 1956. Why did it take three years for Krushchev to "realize" Stalin's errors? The real reason for the shift in policy was to deceive the West. In the same year he denounced Stalin, he brutally repressed the freedom fighters in Hungary. Krushchev's denouncement of Stalin was nothing more than a hoax.
Gorbachev and his policy makers, the Politburo, are no doubt planning the next expansionist policy. The World is now being "set up" for this impending right shift. As soon as the Politburo decides the time is right, the Soviet Union will once again embark on an expansionist policy. Scores of articles and "analyses" have been written claiming that the reason for Glasnost-Perestroika is to stimulate the economy and that unless the reforms succeed Gorbachev will be in trouble because of "conservative" resistance to his reforms. Such disinformation is nothing more that a trick and a ruse to convince people that Gorbachev is sincere and that the West should help more in aid and trade to prevent a return to "Stalinism". Here's a sample article from the L A Times:
At least one other area--where the West is being "set-up" to a return to Stalinism is in the so-called "Nationalism problem". Again, scores of articles have been written concerning the rising nationalist groups. A top Communist party official has been quoted (no doubt disinformation) as saying that "nationalism is the most dangerous phenomenon5
hat can occur in our situation. It's what we are most Afraid of. (62) " The news article where this was reported then went on to say that the Nationalistic problems might reach the point where they can't be controlled and then the Soviet Union would have no alternative but to step in and suppress counter-revolutionary forces (63) .
Another facet of Gorbachev's policies is to placate the West into believing that the "cold war" is over and to negotiate arms reduction agreements while at the same time extracting aid and trade from the West as part of a process to weaken the West. Soviet ideologue Possony has written concerning this strategy the following:
The purpose of these "forces" would be to stir up the peace and the "new social movements" to demand that the United States and the West enter into arms reduction and other peace agreements and treaties. Of course, Soviet deception in arms control, deployment, treaties, etc. is so notorious that clearly part of Gorbachev's strategy is to gain military superiority by such negotiations in order to better embark on an expansionist campaign.
What can one say about Glasnost-Perestroika if he looks objectively at the evidence? The evidence is unmistakable that Marxist-Leninist ideology governs the Soviet Union in all of their domestic and foreign policy decisions. Gorbachev has based all his reforms on Lenin. Lenin's idea was to include the Communist party as the vanguard of the proletariat to achieve the world-wide violent revolution. On November 2, 1987, Gorbachev made the following statement:
The historical evidence is clear as to just what Glasnost is: a self-criticism tool to strengthen and legitimize the State.
The evidence is also abundant that the Soviet Union has followed the dialectical nature of advance in all of their policy shifts to date. The Communist strategy is: when weak negotiate, when strong attack. Perestroika, just as the NEP under Lenin, is meant to broaden the Soviet Union's appeal, strengthen them economically and militarily while at the same time sapping the West through aid and trade.
Evidence is also abundant that the so called historical revisions and denunciations of past Soviet leaders that the Soviet Union undergoes from time to time are merely hoaxes.
Furthermore, the Soviet leaders are mere figureheads in a totalitarian machine and not the "charismatic new breeds" that the disinformation press would have us believe.
Finally consider the following statements from two Communist leaders and two anti-Communist spokesmen:
War to the hilt between communism and capitalism is inevitable. But today we are too weak to strike. Our day will come in 30 to 40 years. But first we must lull the capitalist nations to sleep with the greatest overtures of peace and disarmament known throughout history. And then when their guard is dropped, we will smash them with our clenched fist (67)
To speak of communism as ended. is absurd. This concept of a profoundly democratic society. is immortal. Perestroika does n
represent abandonment of Communism but purification (68)
Are Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika for real? While smiling at Americans, Gorbachev calls for Communists to rededicate themselves to the Leninist cause of world conquest and communism. to fully comprehend Gorbachev's words one must understand that when communists use the term 'socialism' they are referring to the present system which the Americans call communism. When communists use the word 'democracy' they understand it to mean 'communism' Frederich Engels wrote 'communism today is democracy' Contemporary communists still use the Engels definition (69)
More and more people are being lulled into greater complacency. Gorbachev's motives are to disarm the West and denuclearize NATO. [Gorbachev wants a] massive infusion of financial assistance and to obtain a 'most favored nation' status among world economic leaders. If Gorbachev succeeds with this ploy, then it will strengthen and perpetuate a system that is evil (70)
In the past, we have tried to deal with Communism in different ways. We have pointed out atrocities. We have spoken about the perversions of certain Communist leaders. We have tried to "contain" Communism. However, it is now time to stop Communism.
1. Causa Institute, "Causa Lecture Manual", New York, Causa Institute, 1985. P. 8.
5. Winston Churchill, in a speech given 1 October 1939 as found at http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/RusnEnig.html
6. Causa Institute, Op Cite, p. 15
8. Schwartz, Fred. "You Can Trust The Communists: To Be Communists", Long Beach, Ca. Chantico Publishing Co., 1969. p. 30.
9. "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" 27 vols. Moscow: Sovetakaia Entsiklopedia Publishing House, 1970. vol 3. p. 156.
Bouscaren, Anthony. Is the Cold War Over?. Falls Church, Va.: the Capitol Hill Press, 1953. p. 8,9. Ibid. p.9. 13. Ibid.
16. Great Soviet Encyclopedia. op cit, vol. 17. p. 201.
17. Gross, Problems of Communism. 1988. p. 69.Ibid. p. 70.
21. Ibid.Schifter, Richard. Address of Richard Schifter before the American Bar Association in San Francisco August 10, ]987.
24.Gorbachev, Mikhail. "Document: The Revolution and Perestroika." Foreign Affairs. Winter (87-88), p. 420.
27. Great Soviet Encyclopedia. Op Cit
28. Ibid. under Communist morality.
29. Sleeper, Raymond S. Mesmerized by the Bear: The Soviet Strategy of deception. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co. 1987. p.73.
34. Lenin, Vladimir I. U.S. Congress. House Committee on Un-American Activities. The Communist Conspiracy: Strategy and Tactics of World Communism. 86th. cong., 2cd. sess., 1960. p. 181.
37. Gorbachev, Mikhail. Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World. New York: Harper and Row, 1987. p. 8.
38. Bouscaren, Op Cit 5 Fukuyama, Francis. "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy." Problems of communism. September-October 1987, 113.
43.Fukuyama 3 Bouscaren 71.
44. Timmerman, Heinz. The Decline of the World Communist Movement. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. pxvii.
47. Gorbachev, Foreiqn Affairs, Op Cit. 410.
48. Herspring, Dale R. "On Perestroika: Gorbachev, Yazov and the Military." Problems of Communism. July-August 1987: 99-107.
55. Gorbachev, Perestroika. Op cit p. 1-26.
58. Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr. World Communism. Springfield, Virginia: Global Affairs Publishing company, 1987. p. 57.
60. Los Anqeles Times. Oct-Nov 1987.
64.Possony, Stefan T. A Century of Conflict: communist techniques of World Revolution. Chicago: Regnery. 1953. p. 87.
66.Gorbachev, Foreign Affairs. Op Citp. 54.
67. Manuilski, Dimitri., in a speech to the Lenin School for Political Warfare in Moscow in the 1930's.
68. Aptheker, Herbert. (Communist Theoretician for the Communist Party of the United States of America, CPUSA), San Jose Mercury News, January 7, ]990.
69. Stormer, John A. None Dare Call it Treason. 25 Years Later, Liberty Bell Press, 1990, 406 pages, indexed, hardbound.
70. Funderburk, David. (Former Ambassador to Poland) in a speech delivered to the Americanism foundation in Salt Lake City, Wednesday December 6, 1989, Deseret News, Thursday December 7, 1989 A2,A3.